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Implementing the Chief Financial Officers Act 
and the Government Performance and Results 
Act in the Federal Government 
L. R.JONES 
JERRY L. McCAFFERY 
The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993, along with other legislation passed by Congress, are stimulating 
major financial management reform in the federal government. This article evaluates 
reform implementation against nine criteria developed in previous research on this 
topic. The criteria are accounting system adequacy, congressional intent, ability of 
Congress to use financial statement data, executive branch implementation incentives, 
capability of the Office of Management and Budget, utility of financial statements for 
decision making, use of performance measures in budgeting, coordination of federal 
organizations charged with implementation responsibility, and executive and congres-
sional support for reform. 
INTRODUCTION: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO REFORM 
In a Counterpoint essay concluding a symposium on federal financial management 
reform that appeared in Public Budgeting and Finance in 1993, it was argued that the 
Chief Financial Officers Act (CFOA) and other financial management reforms might 
not achieve their objectives due to a number of barriers to implementation.1 The 
potential impediments identified were: (a) accounting system weaknesses, (b) that 
Congress passed the Act for the wrong reasons, ( c) inability of Congress to use finan-
cial statement data for decision making, (d) executive branch incentives to avoid 
scrutiny, (e) incapability within the management component of the President's Office 
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of Management and Budget, (t) weaknesses of financial statements, (g) inability to 
successfully implement performance measurement in budgeting, (h) budgetary incen-
tives to avoid identification of full program costs, and (i) unachievable requirements 
for agency cooperation and compromise in implementation. 
In addition, the essay concluded that President Bush had not taken a high profile 
stand in support of the CFOA. One reason offered to explain this was the judgment on 
the part of presidential advisors that the CFOA was not interesting to voters and 
taxpayers relative to other initiatives. Therefore, it appeared that an important impedi-
ment to federal financial management reform was the absence of strong support per-
sonally from the President. This article evaluates progress in implementing the CFOA 
and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 relative to the potential 
impediments noted above. 
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM WEAKNESSES 
Accurate and reliable accounting systems are critical to successful production of 
auditable financial statements. Counterpoint suggested that departments and agencies 
might not invest sufficient effort to improve accounting systems to produce accurate 
data upon which financial statements would be based.2 This absence of investment was 
not predicted because departments would not want to make such investment, but 
because they would lack the money. 
What we have found after three years is that departments and agencies have in-
vested to a considerable extent in improving their accounting systems. They also have 
in some instances provided detailed estimates of the costs of substantial improvement 
and consolidation. The President and Congress initially made an effort to address these 
funding demands. For example, the President's Budget for 1992 requested $647 mil-
lion for funding financial systems upgrades and Congress appropriated $628 million.3 
However, since this time, significant amounts have not been appropriated specifically 
for improving accounting syste!lls, with the exception of funding for the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Department of Defense.4 
With respect to the total cost of implementing the CFO Act, OMB and the CFO 
Council issued the following statement: 
The CFO Act ... requires ... an estimate of the cost of implementing this government wide five-
year plan. For fiscal year 1995, these 24 agencies estimated that maintaining, operating, and 
improving financial management activities will cost an estimated $7.5 billion.5 
Annually, in the fall, agencies are directed by OMB to budget sufficient resources to 
support their five year CFO plans. Hearings are held between OMB and the agencies 
to review agency plans and identify the impact of potential changes on the budget.6 
Thus, departments must report the costs of accounting system improvements, but these 
reports in no way require OMB support for the funding shortfalls that impede improve-
ment of systems in accordance with the intent of the CFO Act. 
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Weaknesses in accounting systems still abound and some cases cause large-scale 
problems. For example, current statutes dictate that excise taxes be earmarked for 
certain purposes, but according to GAO, the IRS accounting system does not have the 
capability to segregate these funds by type. Consequently, it is possible that the 
Superfund Trust Fund and the Highway Trust Fund may be receiving more or less than 
is due them. Another example is the inability of the IRS to match social security wage 
information and actual tax payments. The Social Security Administration receives 
payments based on wage information reported to the IRS, even if the taxes are ulti-
mately not paid. This results in amounts going to the Social Security Fund from other 
tax sources, and while the IRS knows there is a discrepancy, it could not identify the 
amount in 1995.7 Other IRS problems included consistent underestimation of loss 
reserves in farm loans, in student financial aid, and in housing guarantees, over $100 
million of medicare receivables under contractor supervision where collectibility was 
questionable, and liability for known environmental cleanup requirements that could 
range from $200 to $400 billion, not counting estimates for items like groundwater 
pollution where reliable data to solve existing problems do not exist.8 
Insufficient funding to make improvements to accounting and related systems is still 
a significant problem. In the 1995 Federal Financial Management Status Report, 
agencies identified 436 financial management systems currently in operation that need 
to be replaced or upgraded in the next five years. However, the report states, 
" ... agencies lack the funds to replace or upgrade many systems that need it, and 
consequently have no plans to improve them. Funding, personnel, and technology 
constraints make it difficult to implement all of the systems improvements that are 
needed.9 
Improving financial systems, developing financial statements and accounting stan-
dards, and now the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA), are the top three priorities of the Chief Financial Officers Council established 
by the CFOA to guide financial management reform. Table 1 indicates the magnitude 
of the accounting system probleIJ}. It shows the total number of federal financial 
management systems, the number of accounting system applications, the percent of 
these systems planned for upgra_ding or replacement, the age of systems, the percent 
that comply with the standard general ledger requirements of the CFOA, the percent 
that use off-the-shelf software and the percent meeting agency computer standards. 
From 1992 to 1994, the total number of accounting systems was reduced by 7 percent 
and the number of applications by 9 percent, but the federal government still operated 
816 financial management systems, and used 1183 financial management applica-
tions.10 
While more than half of the applications met agency computer standards, only 10 
percent of the applications used off-the-shelf computer software packages, and this 
percentage has declined slightly since 1992. Many large private sector firms use off-
the-shelf packages and are satisfied with them. 11 Federal government systems appear 
either to be too dissimilar or to demand too many agency specific routines to use 
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TABLE! 
Financial Management Systems and Improvement Plans 
1992 1993 1994 
Financial management systems 878 804 816 
FM applications 1306 1273 1183 
Plan to replace 24% 29% 31% 
Plan to upgrade 25% 23% 24% 
Over 10 years old 30% 34% 39% 
Implement standard ledger 30% 31% 34% 
Use off-the-shelf software 13% 12% 10% 
Meet agency computer standards 55% 52% 63% 
(percentages calculated from total number of applications) 
Source: OMB Five Year Plan,1995, Table 2: 5. 
off-the-shelf software. It may be assumed that system improvement and modernization 
will lead to standardization, at least to the point that more systems may use off-the-
shelf software. However, the trend here is not good. 
In 1984, OMB Circular A-127 on financial management systems directed agencies 
to meet two goals: single, integrated, accounting systems and a reduction of the num-
ber of administrative subsystems perf orrning the same function. The General Services 
Administration introduced an off-the-shelf software schedule to help meet these goals, 
and in 1986 a government-wide standard general ledger was established.12 Table 1 
indicates that about 34 percent of the applications met the standard general ledger 
requirement. Also interesting is that 61 percent of these applications are less than ten 
years old, i.e., have been designed and implemented since Circular A-127 was issued. 
According to the 1992 OMB Five Year Plan, "Until the mid-1980s duplicative, incon-
sistent, inefficient, and antiquated financial systems were the rule not the exception."13 
The fact that over 60 percent of _these systems are now less than ten years old must 
mean that they are no longer antiqu-ated, although the other conditions may still apply. 
With steady growth of plans to replace applications, a higher usage of off-the-shelf 
software would seem an important goal. 14 
These numbers may paint too pessimistic a picture, but it is clear that much work 
remains to be done and a significant investment in modernizing systems, upgrading 
procedures (e.g., data entry), and in training people has to be made. All of this will 
require additional funding and it is not yet clear that either the executive or Congress is 
willing to fund the $7 .5 billion dollars estimated to be needed by departments to 
improve accounting systems to meet the requirements of the CFO Act. 
Congress Passed the Act for the Wrong Reasons 
Counterpoint argued that the CFO Act was a product of the competition for power in 
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Congress between oversight and appropriation committees. 15 The oversight commit-
tees in question-the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and its 
subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, and the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs-have not wielded substantial power in 
the past over funding decisions made by appropriations committees in the budget 
formulation process. The CFO Act was viewed as having created a mechanism for 
these committees to gain additional leverage over appropriators. Thus, much of the 
impetus for approval of the CFO Act appeared to be to strengthen one set of commit-
tees against another. 
What we have found is that chairs and members of appropriations committees still 
are not particularly interested in having financial statements to help them make budget 
decisions, nor are they knowledgeable about the implications of the CFOA or GPRA. 
However, OMB and many members-of Congress not serving on these powerful com-
mittees still appear to want appropriators to use financial reports and GPRA perfor-
mance data. Pressure from the oversight committees has not lessened in the transition 
to a Republican-controlled Congress. In fact, in 1995 and 1996, Senators Ted Stevens 
(chair) and John Glenn (minority chair) of the Governmental Affairs Committee, who 
along with Senator William Roth (Senate Finance Committee Chair) was an original 
sponsor of the CFO and GPRA Acts, have continued to press for implementation and 
results. In the House, Rep. William Clinger, the Committee Chair, Rep. Collins and 
subcommittee chair Rep. Steven Hom among others, applied similar pressure. Conse-
quently, it appears that while overall congressional interest in implementation of the 
CFO Act, GPRA and GMRA is low, these Acts have a few strong advocates whose 
resolve has not lessened. Senator Fred Thompson of the Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee is highly informed and enthusiastic about implementation of the CFOA and 
GPRA. In the House, Speaker Newt Gingrich and his staff have embraced the CFOA 
and GPRA. The Speaker has sponsored a series of training sessions for Republican 
House members and staff on the implementation and implications of financial manage-
ment reform legislation, particularly the GPRA. 
This support notwithstanding, the view still prevails in some quarters that Congress 
passed the CFOA, and GPRA as well, for the "wrong" reasons, despite all of the lofty 
rhetoric about the need for financial management reform. Eventually, the critics may 
be a minority in Congress in an era when much more emphasis is placed on increasing 
government effectiveness and efficiency. The CFO Act and following legislation, 16 the 
Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) and the Government Performance and 
Review Act (GPRA) appear to be in tune with current congressional preferences. Does 
this mean that appropriator behavior will change? It is too early to tell, but they 
probably will face more pressure from oversight committee members, from more of 
their colleagues and from OMB to use financial statement and performance informa-
tion in appropriation decision making. The task at hand presently for reform advocates 
in Congress is to better educate members and staff about the CFOA and GPRA as 
some still know little, if anything, about this legislation. 
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Inability of Congress to Use Financial Statement Data for Decision Making 
Counterpoint speculated that even if Congress wished to implement the CFO Act for 
the "right" reasons (i.e., to stimulate needed financial reform), 17 and even if financial 
statement data were accurate, Congress is institutionally incapable of making long-
range financial decisions based upon information in financial statements. The same 
observation may be made with respect to the use of performance measures and strate-
gic plans mandated by GPRA. It was argued that financial statements would not 
replace the annual budget as the primary methodology for resource decision making in 
the nation's capitol because the budget provides the money that keeps the wheels of 
politics rolling and financial reports do not provide budget justification. What mem-
bers of Congress and their staffs care most about in budgeting is winning and losing 
battles over programs and money tooperate them. Further, it was argued that in many 
instances, Congress appears not to have much interest in costs. 
Evaluating behavior relative to these criticisms, it appears that in an era of budget 
balancing, Congress has become more cost conscious and strongly inclined to pressure 
departments and agencies to cut costs. 18 If members of Congress come to perceive the 
CFO Act, GPRA and GMRA as helping them to demonstrate to the American public 
their commitment to budget balancing and cost cutting, then it seems they may be 
more likely to embrace the products of these Acts. 
OMB and Office of Federal Financial Management (OFFM) staff are attempting to 
deal with how to use data in audited financial statements and performance reports once 
they are available. OMB Director Franklin Raines, Comptroller Edward DeSeve and 
other officials have made clear the intention to use department financial and perfor-
mance data in budget proposal examination and, perhaps, in budget execution control. 
While it is still true that neither OMB staff nor congressional oversight staff yet know 
exactly how they are going to use financial statement and performance data, OMB is 
well on its way to integration of data so that it can be used as reported in Part I of this 
series on federal financial manag~ment reform. 19 However, neither the President nor 
OMB can force Congress to use data as they wish. Congress will have to be persuaded 
that it is in its interest to do so before any significant change in congressional practice 
will occur. 
Some observers clearly view use of financial statement data in the appropriation 
process as critical to the ongoing implementation and utilization of the CFO Act, the 
GPRA, and GMRA. For example, drawing on their study of CFOA implementation, 
Mr. William Phillips of Coopers and Lybrand observed: 
40 
... it's important that Congress use the financial statements when deliberating that organization's 
budget request. This would visibly integrate the intent of the act into the budget process and 
address one of the questions that we've heard a lot from them (program managers) when their 
concern is if the financial statements don't help us somehow, some way in terms of budget 
requests, it becomes difficult to put the full force and intent of the efforts that you need to meet 
those acts in place.20 
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Concern has been expressed by members of Congress about the nature of the data in 
audited financial statements. Senator Hank Brown emphasized that summary data 
might not be useful to the appropriation committees in a remark to Edward DeSeve 
during a Government Affairs hearing on the CFOA: 
... It's fine to have a summary like this. Your chairman (Sen. Stevens) is also one of the very 
senior members on the appropriations committee. When he's over there trying to put an appro-
priations bill together and supervise all of the subcommittees and all of that kind of stuff, they 
can't operate on a summarized view of things. They have to have specific line items, dollar 
figures, dollars and cents to put in the appropriations. They can't do it just on generalized figures. 
If this summarizes those other things in enough detail, they can do that; then this is a big step 
forward. If not, if this is a summary that isn't useful to him, then it doesn't seem like it does much.21 
Mr. DeSeve responded: 
This is ... if you will, the audited financial statement and the summary of performance of results. 
What we need to do is spend time with this Committee (Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs), with OMB, and then with the appropriators to find out how to create a similar document 
on the front end of the appropriations process.22 
Mr. DeSeve went on to say that he was uncomfortable with the idea that, 
... the administration requires departments to submit to the President budget information. They 
then have to resubmit different information to the Congress. Well, if it's good enough for the 
Congress, it ought to be good enough for the President. We'd love to find a way to have a 
seamless transmission, working with the appropriators, of detailed performance information and 
financial information that meet their needs, and we need to spend some time working with them 
to find out how to do that.23 
This would, of course, make a dramatic change in the budget process insofar as the 
appropriators are concerned. Given the dictates of appropriation process history, 
DeSeve's view seems very optimistic. Nonetheless, Senator Stevens, then Committee 
Chairman, expressed a need for consistency in the use of data from financial reports in 
the entire federal budget process: 
In my opinion, I think we ought to have what the comptroller general says that Australia has ... We 
ought to have the ability to look at the reports you've got and analyze them before you come up, 
and we ought to be dealing with the same numbers ... We ought to have the same printout 
available to us, the same computerization available to you, and we ought not to have this constant 
bickering about what the numbers are. We need just one set ofnumbers.24 
Mr. DeSeve agreed with this comment and suggested some of the complexity that 
prevented the federal government from having a more uniform system. 
When you look at corporate America, there are really two different models. The Wal-Mart model 
is a single integrated firm which does essentially the same kinds of things within the firm. The 
other model for firms is what I'll call the General Electric model, the holding company model, 
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where the large steam turbine generator division, where General Electric Credit Corporation ... 
(there) are very different kinds of enterprises. They require very different kinds of information 
coming up to a consolidated reporting framework at the management level. What we've decided 
to do in the federal government is begin the process by designing for each of those enterprises, 
each of those entities, as GE does, an accounting system that meets management's needs. That's 
the process that is undergoing now .... 25 
Mr. DeSeve concluded that the challenge in the next three years was to integrate all 
financial statement and budget information so it would be useful across government 
and then use these data (and the systems that produce financial information) without 
unduly interfering with the operability of agencies: 
That's the strategy we've chosen rather than a one-size fits all, to allow twenty-four entities to 
design one just for them, and then to find the commonalties ... [then to] take the best system and 
migrate to that system, and we believe that is an appropriate step, but it's a process that's got 
three or four steps to it. Unfortunately, moving to a single system, we think, would blur some of 
the utility for particular agencies.26 
In response to DeSeve's testimony, Senator Stevens indicated that the federal gov-
ernment was closer to Wal-Mart than GE. He then asked DeSeve why he had picked 
GE as a model. DeSeve answered that there were great differences among agencies: 
I think the GE model was picked because of the great differences among the agencies in their 
roles and missions. Again, even setting aside the Defense Department, which is very large, the 
mission of the Department of Housing and Urban Development is very different from the mission 
of the Environmental Protection Agency. One serves the public directly by providing housing and 
other services through state and local government. The other is a regulatory entity that regulates 
and monitors and establishes liabilities over time, so that's very different. And then you throw the 
State Department into the mix which is a direct service agency. There are really-and I don't 
mean to beiabor this-different accounting issues. One of EPA's big problems is how do we 
value Superfund sites and the liability for those sites? ... A system that doesn't monitor income 
eligibility doesn't help HUD. One that does doesn't help EPA. So that's really the reason we 
started with that strategy.27 
Senator Stevens then commented, " ... my eyes are appropriator's eyes, and I see all 
of those entities out there doing two things: Either spending taxpayer's money or 
bringing in taxpayer's money ."28 
Senator Glenn reinforced and elaborated on the perspective of appropriators: 
.... I've been preaching for years that there are three parts of the budgeting process. One is the 
revenues, one is the expenditures, and the other is the efficiency, and we never get around to 
efficiency. And that's the reason for CFO and all the rest of these things here.29 
Elsewhere in testimony, Senator Glenn asked a representative of the accounting 
firm of Coopers and Lybrand if he could identify the dollars saved as a result of 
efficiency-oriented audits. The representative replied that the ratio was approximately 
$10 saved for every dollar spent.30 He added that application of activity based costing 
42 Public Budgeting & Finance I Spring 1997 
(ABC) in the private sector is critical to achieve savings. Implicitly supporting the core 
of the GPRA, he also noted that ABC 
... tells you what it costs to really do something as opposed to the way that we traditionally 
manage in terms of payroll lines, travel lines, training lines, budget lines. Those are the kinds of 
things that we need to get to so that we know what we're paying for. And measures with focus 
on ... customers will allow you to determine if in fact agencies are doing what they're supposed 
to be doing. 31 
In discussing the use of the standard general ledger, Senator Brown made the 
following comment with respect to achieving cost savings as a result of audits of 
financial statements.32 
What I was concerned about is, you go through this process of trying to find areas to control 
expenditures. Where I've run into it is the fact that, given the number of expenditure areas, we 
didn't have a standard account that would reveal, for example, how much a department had spent 
on travel or how much had been spent on printing, or how much had been spent on rent, or so on. 
Is there a way your office could forward to us a breakout of what might be thought of as the 
overhead accounts and their description? ... It's one of the intriguing things, because at least in 
business .... I found the kind of things I would have looked at first in business to cut, we didn't 
even have a way of ascertaining how much was spent on it.33 
Mr. DeSeve responded that it was easier to analyze costs within departments than to 
make cross-department comparisons. The implication of Senator Brown's comments is 
that Congress may use more and better financial and performance information to 
further "micromanage" the Executive branch. Neither OMB nor departments want this 
to happen, yet how to avoid it is not clear. The approach apparently now favored by 
OMB is to provide Congress with full financial data in accordance with the CFO Act, 
but only summary performance data in compliance with GPRA.34 Thus, the prospect 
exists that OMB and executive departments may use one set of performance measures 
and Congress another. 
All of this discussion indicates that some members of Congress are interested in 
using data from financial statements and performance reports to examine the costs and 
efficiency of executive agencies. However, it may be misleading to assume that Sena-
tors Stevens, Glenn, and Brown accurately represent the views of the majority of 
members of Congress or the appropriations committees in particular. 
Executive Branch Incentives to Avoid Scrutiny 
Counterpoint suggested that departments and agencies may not want to aid congres-
sional oversight committees in micromanagement of the executive,35 nor do they want 
to assist Congress in gaining its programmatic priorities over those of the President 
and his Cabinet appointees. Therefore, they would be unlikely to want to wash the 
"dirty linen" of departmental mismanagement before Congress under the legislative 
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and media spotlight in review of financial statements and performance measurement 
reports. 
Thus far, it is too early to determine an outcome relative to this criticism. Until 
financial and performance data are provided to OMB and made public, we cannot tell 
what they will show. Moreover, until Congress receives this data, we cannot define 
what they will do with it. However, what can be said at this point is that OMB will use 
financial and performance information directly in examining agency budgets. This 
supplies strong incentive for agencies to respond to OMB requests, but the incentive to 
"oversell" or to "strategically represent or misrepresent" budget data would seem to be 
unchanged. And, as observed with respect to Senator Brown's comments above, the 
proclivity of Congress to micromanage is omnipresent. 
Capability of the Management Component of the President's Office 
of Management and Budget 
Counterpoint observed that the "M" in OMB (the Management side) might not have 
sufficient capacity to fully implement the CFO Act.36 By making a commitment to the 
use of financial and performance report data in budget review, OMB has implicitly 
recognized the validity of this criticism. Budget examiners and OMB senior officials 
will provide the incentive for departments to comply with the CFOA and GPRA 
through budget review. OMB use of budget financial and performance data is intended 
to be part of a comprehensive process of review, from policy development through 
program implementation and evaluation. To serve the President well, these responsi-
bilities should be carried out in an integrated rather than fragmented manner. On this 
point, an OMB official suggested that: 
Recent evidence from both here and abroad suggests that integrating budget and management 
responsibilities, not separating them, is the most productive and effective approach. At a recent 
symposium of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ministers 
responsible for public management from the 26 OECD countries identified common features of 
successful governance reforms. What oecame apparent was that reform efforts are likely to fail if 
management considerations are seen as distinct from budgetary policies. Countries moving to-
ward public sector reform are building alliances between these efforts and see them as mutually 
reinforcing. Indeed, important aspects of many reform agendas are inherently budgetary in na-
ture. These include controlling the costs of direct government operations, providing financial 
flexibility to permit resources to be used more effectively, financing essential training, reallocat-
ing tasks to the private or voluntary sectors and assessing performance.37 
A General Accounting Office's report entitled Changes Resulting From the OMB 
2000 Reorganization38 analyzed the results of the reorganization under former Direc-
tor Alice Rivlin intended to better integrate OMB's budget analysis, management 
review, and policy roles. GAO found that: 
44 
... there was greater attention to agency management issues in the fiscal year 1996 budget 
process (after OMB 2000 was implemented) than in the fiscal year 1995 process. A greater 
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variety of management issues were presented in more depth in the fiscal year 1996 documents 
than in the previous years' documents ... OMB's initial experience with the OMB 2000 ap-
proach during the 1996 budget process showed the clear support of top OMB officials and staff to 
enhance the treatment of certain management issues in the budget. Even though this was a 
particularly difficult budget cycle, there was a noticeable increase in the attention OMB gave to 
management issues that transcended immediate budgetary concems.39 
It is clear that Rivlin recognized these issues. In 1993 as a part of this reorganiza-
tion, OMB decreased the size of the Office of Federal Financial Management. OFFM 
personnel have been assigned at least part of the time to the Resource Management 
Offices (budget analysis offices) where they work side by side with the budget exam-
iners and analysts. 
These changes did not go unnoticed by Congress as questions from Senator Glenn 
to Mr. DeSeve illustrated: · -
Sen. Glenn: " ... the OMB 2000 [initiative on reorganization] ... resulted in the shrinking of the 
statutory office you had, OFFM, from a staff of forty-one down to twenty, and I know they're 
supposedly working off here in other places and things. Do they report back to you or how do 
you do that? I guess the basic question is, are you still able to do your job with only 20 people?" 
Mr. DeSeve: "One of the criticisms of the management side of OMB is that it never talked to 
the budget side, so we sent our agents out into the budget side. We have them burrowed into the 
budget side. Whether it's cash management or whether it's debt collection or whether it's getting 
budget people for the first time to look at an audited financial statement, understand and interpret 
it ... " 
Sen. Glenn: " ... when they first proposed this thing ... I didn't see how you were going to 
put people out [there] without getting them preempted out there, wherever they are, and you have 
to have absolute trust that these people are feeding you back all the information you need or the 
system doesn't work right, it seems to me. Is it working?" 
Mr. DeSeve: "Yes, sir. I think it is. Yesterday we had a need-very quickly-within a couple 
of hours to prepare some answers to some legislative questions. I called on the people who 
formerly had been in our organization, for example, asking questions about IRS. They used to be 
in our place. I said, 'how are they doing?' Within 10 minutes I got a response back from an 
individual, giving me chapter and verse of what was going on there. And we had other situations 
that were very similar to it yesterday." 
Sen. Glenn: "Since these people are supposedly reporting to you but they're being paid out 
there, have you had any cases, so far, where their boss ... has said ... 'I'd just as soon you 
didn't tell all this stuff up there, because ... I don't think he should know this.' Any cases like 
that?" 
Mr. DeSeve: "None that I know of. In fact, it's actually been the reverse. Our folks have 
affected, we believe, the budget side of the House with the need for better financial management, 
giving us a lot of leverage. Instead of losing twenty, we think we've probably gained 200 
[analysts ]"40 
This testimony demonstrates that Mr. DeSeve is confident in the capability of OMB 
and OFFM to fulfill the requirements of CFOA and GPRA. The new Director of 
OMB, Franklin Raines, OFFM and the budget staff appear to be moving in the same 
direction to implement the Acts. Furthermore, department financial and accounting 
staff opposed to the CFOA and GPRA have not been able to convince their top 
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leadership that what OMB wants under the Acts is unreasonable or unobtainable. Still, 
departments have argued convincingly that some changes requested by OMB (e.g., 
significantly redesigned accounting systems) are presently unaffordable. Finding the 
dollars necessary to improve financial systems in the current climate may be a signifi-
cant barrier to reform despite acceptance of the goals of the Acts. Absence of funding 
also could provide an excuse for departments that fail to obtain clean opinions (i.e., no 
errors) in audits of their financial statements. 
Weaknesses in Financial Statements 
Counterpoint observed that financial statements for one year may confirm facts al-
ready known by department financial managers,41 but, to use financial statement data 
effectively, trend data from multiple'years is needed and that most departments do not 
possess reliable trend data outside of budgetary accounts. And even here, data bases 
are weak in some departments. 
It is too early to draw a conclusion on this criterion, but financial statements have 
been prepared and audited for selected agencies. All agencies prepared statements for 
1997 and there is every intention to build reliable data bases that will enable trend 
analysis. OMB's 1995 Federal Financial Management Report indicated steady 
progress in producing and auditing financial statements. As of July 1995, 100 entities 
had been audited and 58 percent were given a clean opinion, meaning that their 
statements were presented fairly in accordance with the basis of accounting adopted by 
the agency. Forty-three percent were reported by auditors as having no material weak-
ness in internal controls, meaning that the design or operation of one or more of the 
internal control elements reduced to a relatively low risk any errors or irregularities 
occurring in amounts material to the financial statement. If any errors or irregularities 
occurred, they would be detected in a timely manner by employees performing their 
assigned functions. In contrast, only three entities were audited and only one had a 
clean opinion in 1990.42 
While this is an indication of substantial progress, many issues remain. Some ex-
perts have proposed a selective, rather than comprehensive audit approach, urging that 
attention be focused on what can be audited and what is most important to audit. As 
explained by Mr. Edward Sheridan of the Federal Executive Institute in testimony 
before Congress: 
46 
... rather than look at DoD as a huge entity, it's so big, it's so complex, that you can never get 
your arms around; if you go down to the legal entity basis, find those entities that we can audit 
and are auditable; do them first and have a program of systematic audits so there would be a 
score card that will say, okay, there are some issues out here that are going to be so difficult to 
deal with ... In the meantime, you go to those entities that are part of the cutting edge delivery of 
services and make sure that they're working. I'd far rather know that the air combat command is 
doing its job well. It's got its financial house in order; then trying to account for some bombs that 
have been out in the deserts for 20 or 30 years.43 
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Nonetheless, funding to sustain improvement efforts is still a problem, as Mr. William 
Phillips of Coopers and Lybrand commented: 
The financial managers and the IGs were clear [that] the downsizing and budget cuts are affect-
ing their operations. Only one-third of the financial managers reported that their offices received 
additional funding to implement CFO Act requirements. However, nearly two-thirds of the finan-
cial managers and the majority of the inspectors general noted that downsizing and the National 
Performance Review's emphasis on streamlining administration was hampering their implemen-
tation of the Act.44 
Phillips offered two recommendations to Congress regarding the use of financial 
statements and performance data. First, Congress should be observed using financial 
statements and performance data when deliberating over budget requests. Second, if 
financial and performance statements-a.re not viewed as helping agencies in the budget 
process, agencies may become discouraged and not put forth the effort needed to meet 
the requirements of the CFOA and GPRA. 
Additionally, Phillips suggested that Congress needed to provide resources and 
protect those implementing the Acts from 'excessive downsizing': 
It is important ... that Congress protect the offices of the CFO and the offices of the inspector 
general from excessive downsizing cuts while still holding them accountable for improved finan-
cial management and reporting, customer service and cost-effective operations. These improve-
ments are both necessary and important. Investing a few million now to implement the CFO Act 
will yield billions of dollars of savings in the future.45 
The CFO and GPRA initiatives appear to have increased attention markedly as to 
how financial and performance statement data may be used in detecting and resolving 
financial problems, e.g., identifying previously unidentifiable disbursements and elimi-
nating over-payment of contractors in DoD, or defining unspecified revenues and 
identifying pending liabilities in the Treasury. However, what must be guarded against 
is promising too much from financial statement data. It is a misrepresentation to 
declare that [as a result of financiru- statement preparation and performance measure-
ment], "Americans will soon know for the first time whether they are getting what they 
pay for" as stated in the Third Report of the Vice President's National Performance 
Review.46 Financial statements do not provide enough of the right kinds of data to 
support such conclusions. Even if departments and OMB are able to integrate financial 
and performance data in a way that relates to budget accounts, caution must be exer-
cised to avoid sweeping claims of success. The road to federal government financial 
management and budget reform is littered with similar, politically motivated promises, 
that tend to turn off Washington insiders who have watched as the various initiatives 
have bloomed and withered with the passing of Presidential regimes. 
Inability to Successfally Implement Performance Measurement in Budgeting 
Counterpoint47 predicted that performance measurement as required by the GPRA 
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might not be implemented well or at all by departments and agencies. It also suggested 
that performance measurement is expensive to perform properly. If performance mea-
surement were affordable and easy to accomplish, it already would have been done 
since the federal government has attempted to implement performance budgeting in 
one form or another from the late 1940s through the 1950s when Maurice Stans was 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget under President Eisenhower.48 
In reviewing the evidence thus far, over seventy pilot performance measurement 
projects were submitted by twenty-seven agencies in 1995 in response to OMB's 
request for proposals to conduct performance measurement experiments under the 
authority of the GPRA.49 It is apparent that few agencies wanted to be left out of the 
performance measurement initiative. Given that the budget will eventually be the 
primary leverage point available to OMB to enforce the requirements of the CFOA, 
GMRA and GPRA, agencies apparently have perceived that they needed to be viewed 
as willing and eager to play in this new game. 
What will result from these experiments is uncertain. A repackaging of measures 
already in use is one alternative. Preliminary reports from a diversity of agencies 
demonstrate successful implementation of portions of the GPRA mandate. These agen-
cies include the Department of Transportation's Office of Budget and Program Perfor-
mance, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Office of Strategic Planning in the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, the Office of Policy and Strategic Planning, National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (Department of Commerce), and the Bureau of Rec-
lamation, Department of the Interior.SO 
The GAO has issued reports to help agencies implement GPRA in which under-
standable instructions on how to define mission and outcomes and to develop perfor-
mance measures are provided.51 The experience of these agencies shows that strategic 
and performance plans including measurable indicators of performance can be pre-
pared successfully. Moreover, agencies reported that they benefited from the experi-
ence-the goal was not mere compliance with GPRA and OMB directives. Strategic 
and performance planning enabl~d review and reformulation of agency missions, 
achieved greater clarity of objectives, and resulted in a better understanding of rela-
tionships between mission and outcomes. 
OMB envisions eventual development of definitive performance measures linked to 
accurate cost accounting with results issued in "Accountability Reports" in conform-
ance to National Performance Review imperatives. This is a worthwhile goal, one 
shared by many governments worldwide, and real progress has been made in some 
venues, for example, New Zealand.52 OMB recognizes that the leap from performance 
measurement as required by GPRA to performance budgeting, which is not required, is 
fraught with problems, not the least of which is the need for accurate cost accounting 
data. Since FASAB produced and OMB issued accounting principals and standards for 
the federal government in 1996 and departments and agencies are training employees 
in compliance with these, it will be awhile before we can determine the result of all 
this activity. The intent to do it well is present in OMB, and there is no doubt that 
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congressional oversight committees want the data. We still maintain that appropriators 
will resist what they perceive as "budgeting by formula" because it will reduce their 
discretion and power. 
The risk that OMB will tilt at windmills in attempting to implement performance 
measurement under a single template in federal organizations tremendously diverse in 
mission and operation seems to be low. OMB policy guidance appears to circumvent 
this problem. OMB and OFFM want to avoid creating a blizzard of paper containing 
useless information of the type that helped kill zero-based budgeting, and such a goal 
is probably obtainable. Nevertheless, the utility of performance data will continue to 
be subject to interpretation. Experimentation with performance budgeting pilot 
projects will commence in 1997 for FY 98 and beyond, but all parties involved in 
GPRA implementation appear to be cautious about the outcome of the pilot projects. 
In the end, Congress bears the responsibility for determining whether performance 
measurement and budgeting pilots reveal sufficient promise to cause wider application 
across the federal government. 53 
Budgetary Incentives to Avoid Identification of Full Program Costs 
Counterpoint54 concluded that the CFO Act may fail to meet its goal of causing the 
full costs of programs to be considered from a financial management perspective at the 
point of decision due to the fact that some agency budget analysts and decisionmakers 
might not be skilled enough to apply net present value to determine appropriate dis-
count rates or to carefully weigh benefit-cost ratios of alternatives from a long-range 
financial perspective. 
The point of this criticism was that decisionmakers and program advocates in some 
instances do not want the full costs of decisions to be assessed in budgeting. Alteration 
of this incentive structure through implementation of CFOA, GMRA, and GPRA is 
unlikely. There remain very real incentives for departments and agencies to hide the 
full costs of comprehensive social welfare, national defense, public land management, 
transportation, energy and other programs in the federal budget decision process. This 
tactic that rewards full cost concealment in the budget process was identified long ago 
by Aaron Wildavsky as the "camel's nose" strategy.55 
The manner in which Congress makes decisions in the annual budget cycle at times 
stimulates the concealing of full costs. However, in considering the budget from a 
perspective of seven years to achieve balance, and in attempting to assure the financial 
stability of entitlement programs including Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, 
both Congress and the Executive demonstrate an increasing ability to use more sophis-
ticated analytical methods in budgeting. Appropriations committees now deal with 
some budget requests based on present value estimates, especially in credit programs 
and for major capital acquisitions. Appropriators are also particularly sensitive to full 
cost disclosure in this era of capped domestic discretionary spending. Congressional 
staff suggest that appropriators do not seek to hide full program costs, but rather have 
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led the fight against "coercive deficiencies." They also note that appropriators are not 
so much resistant to using financial statement data, but rather have never been given 
clear examples of how and why such broadly aggregated and dated information ("quite 
dated" in the words of one staffer) should be used in the appropriations process. 
Moreover, congressional staff support our previous assertion that aggregated data is 
generally inconsistent with the congressional appropriation budget structure and 
cycle.56 
Philosophically, some members of Congress and staff are likely to resist perfor-
mance-based budgeting as a mechanistic approach to resource allocation because it 
assumes certain linear cause and effect relationships, while "very little of the federal 
government is so innocently linear."57 However, whatever the virtues of the appropria-
tors, congressional resource allocation decisions in the 1990s have typically involved 
"end games" of continuing resolutions, government shutdowns, omnibus appropriation 
acts and reconciliation bills where pursuit of macro goals often requires dysfunctional 
sidepayments that confound logical approaches to resource allocation, such as perfor-
mance indicators tied to costs. 
Unachievable Requirements for Agency Cooperation and Compromise in Implementation 
Counterpoint58 observed that implementation of the CFOA [and GPRA] requires ex-
tensive cooperation and coordination between OMB, the Department of the Treasury, 
GAO, twenty-four departments and agencies, two oversight committees of Congress, 
authorization and appropriations committees, the CFO Council, the Federal Account-
ing Standards Advisory Board and other entities. It was noted that the track record for 
cooperation, coordination and compromise of this magnitude between and among 
federal government entities in attempting broad scale reform was mixed at best. 
We are pleased to report that the necessity for cooperation, coordination and com-
promise does not appear to present a substantial barrier to implementation of the Acts. 
This is due to the determination of OMB, Congress, GAO and others that reform will 
succeed and will provide an example that government can be made to "work." OMB is 
determined that traditional defenses of turf will not dominate efforts to implement the 
various provisions of the Acts. Differences on technical issues have been and continue 
to be addressed by OFFM and other OMB staff, by GAO, and by departments and 
agencies. Issues such as accounting standards and inventory valuation methods have 
been addressed responsibly by FASAB and GAO. This is not to say that all depart-
ments agree with the results. Several departments have expressed reservations over 
some of the financial and cost standards. Most departments remain somewhat skeptical 
about whether performance measurement is worth the cost and effort. The extent that 
their skepticism is validated by experience will tend to slow the implementation pro-
cess. However, it seems clear that it will not stop it. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Financial management reform is neither glamorous nor high profile. It is complex and 
no one discipline has a monopoly on the skills needed to accomplish it. Reform must 
be concerned with a myriad of small but important issues in addition to the big 
questions, because little issues often add up to important matters of federal policy and 
practice-and perhaps to billions of dollars either saved or lost through inefficiency 
and misguided reform.59 Further, federal financial management reform advocates are 
concerned with prospects for obtaining sufficient funding to implement needed re-
forms. This concern is legitimate given the certainty of tight domestic budgets from 
the President and Congress. 
With respect to progress on implementation of the CFO Act, Coopers & Lybrand 
and the Association of Government Accountants polled nearly 100 federal agencies to 
assess the implementation of the CFO Act and related legislation. The sample con-
sisted of 124 senior financial managers, CFOs, and deputy CFOs; twenty-six Inspec-
tors General, and 150 program managers. Seventy-five percent of the senior financial 
managers, 81 percent of the Inspectors General, and 66 percent of the program manag-
ers noted broad leadership support for the CFO Act at the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, 
and Assistant Secretary levels. All three groups agreed that the benefits of the annual 
financial statements justify the initial cost and effort. The Inspectors General over-
whelmingly agreed that the CFO Act has contributed to improved financial operations, 
with 80 percent reporting improved financial systems; 96 percent noted improvement 
in financial data, and, most significantly, I 00 percent recognized that, as a result of the 
CFOA and GPRA, internal control procedures were improving. Both the financial 
managers and the IG's suggested that the process of developing statements was more 
valuable than the actual statements themselves because the process contributed to a 
better understanding of program costs and what drives these costs.60 
To gauge agency progress on financial reporting, the survey analysis of responses 
from senior financial managers, including the CFOs and deputy CFOs, and the twenty-
six IG' s revealed that neatly 80 percent were preparing most of the documents and 
reports required by the CFO Act and GPRA. Although much work remains in develop-
ing the performance measures, 86 percent reported at least partial progress. Progress 
also was reported in integrating financial statement information into the budget process 
by about half of the respondents. The bottom line is that 70 percent of the financial 
managers and 62 percent of the IGs believed that their organizations will have 
auditable financial statements by the March 1st, 1997 deadline.61 While these conclu-
sions are most optimistic with respect to financial statements versus the full panoply of 
requirements of CFOA and GPRA, they do indicate satisfaction with progress in 
implementing the key provisions of both Acts. Our research in the period 1995-1996 
reinforces the findings of this survey. Implementation of both the CFOA and GPRA is 
proceeding on schedule to produce the outputs required by law. 
It is apparent that absence of strong support from the President could retard the 
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effort to implement the CFOA and GPRA and the new federal financial management 
structure supported by this and other financial management reform legislation. How-
ever, this appears not to be the case with the Clinton administration. The President has 
supported full implementation of the reforms. This effort is viewed as compatible with 
the goals of the National Performance Review, and Vice President Gore has been at 
the forefront in supporting the initiatives. Former OMB Director Alice Rivlin was 
steadfast in her determination to move ahead briskly and her successor, Franklin 
Raines, shows similar resolve. It seems certain that the implementation effort will not 
fail under this administration due to the absence of high level political and administra-
tive support. Whether this support will result in more funding for departments for 
accounting system improvements, employee training, and other necessary ingredients 
to enable real reform is not yet clear. 
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